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Abstract

A central purpose of performance management reforms such as the Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is to promote the use of performance information in federal agencies. But reforms initiated by partisan political actors may be pursued differently, and may face relatively more obstacles, in agencies whose programs or personnel are associated with divergent political ideologies. Using data from a survey of federal agency managers, our analysis indicates that the impact of PART on managers' use of performance information is largely contingent on the political ideology of the agencies in which managers work. Managers involved with the PART review process report greater performance information use than those not involved if they work in politically moderate and, especially, conservative agencies. However, there is no such difference in liberal agencies between those involved and those not involved with PART reviews. Supplementary analyses provide some evidence that these results are attributable to the PART review process itself, as opposed to inherent differences in the extent to which programs administered by liberal and conservative agencies lend themselves to performance measurement and use.

Introduction

While public organizations generally can avoid death and taxes, they face other certainties in their stead. One is that elected officials will seek to reform them. Another is that such reforms often fail. A major reason why reforms stumble is that agency personnel, whose cooperation is often critical for realizing organizational change, may not dedicate a sufficient amount of effort or resources to their implementation. In this article we explore how an agency's political ideology, which captures the political beliefs and constituencies tied to an agency's personnel and programs, might come to bear. In particular, we propose that managers in agencies that share the ideological predisposition of a political executive (such as a president or governor) may be more willing and able than those in ideologically divergent agencies to implement that executive's reform.

To test this proposition we examine the implementation of what was arguably the most significant government-wide administrative reform of the George W. Bush administration: the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART).[1] The PART process examined the performance of virtually all federal programs over five years, dedicating an extraordinary amount of agency and White House attention and resources to performance management (Moynihan 2008; White 2012). The tool was born from a desire to motivate managers to better use performance data (OMB, 2001), a goal that remains central in the current administration (OMB, 2011). Thus, for the purposes of this study, PART *implementation* entails the *collection of performance information* (the PART review process) and the *use of performance information*. Whereas the OMB under the Bush administration could essentially mandate managerial involvement in the

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[1] The Program Assessment Rating Tool or "PART" actually was a survey instrument that OMB personnel used to evaluate federal programs. This article examines the impact of the PART review process, which involved the use of the instrument to generate an overall performance score. Consistent with common parlance, we use the acronym "PART" to refer to the review process and the tool itself.

PART review process (that is, it could nearly guarantee managerial cooperation in the data collection process) it was dependent to a significant extent on managerial cooperation in realizing its goal that managers use the information collected during the review process. Therefore, while some level of compliance was unavoidable, managers did have some discretion in the degree to which they pursued PART.

There is growing agreement among both academics (Moynihan and Pandey 2010; Van de Walle and Van Dooren 2008) and practitioners (GAO 2008; OMB 2001; 2011) that managerial performance information use is a key goal of performance management systems, but we know little about how political ideology influences use. The politically conservative Bush administration devoted a great deal of effort toward making PART a nonpartisan and rigorous management tool (Dull 2006). Yet, there is evidence from prior empirical studies that political ideology affected PART scores and that liberal agencies were more likely to be affected negatively by these scores (Gallo and Lewis 2012; Gilmour and Lewis 2006a, 2006b, and 2006c). This article is the first to examine whether ideological factors also affected the Bush administration's success in promoting the use of performance information in agency decision-making via the PART review process.

Using respondent-level data from a 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) survey of mid- and upper-level agency managers, as well as independent measures of agency ideology, we examined how managerial involvement in the PART review process—that is, the involvement of agency managers in preparing for, participating in, or responding to the results of any PART assessment—relates to information use across agencies associated with liberal, moderate, and conservative ideologies. We estimated a number of models that employ various measures of information use. The results indicate that managers who report greater involvement

in the PART review process also report greater use of performance information. However, consistent with our proposition above, this effect obtains primarily for managers in moderate and, most significantly, conservative agencies. Indeed, in liberal agencies managerial involvement with PART may even be negatively related to some types of information use. Overall, it appears that the positive impact of managers' involvement with PART reviews is contingent on agency ideology.

We also conducted supplementary analyses to explore possible reasons for PART's differential impact across agencies. We found that managers in liberal agencies who were involved with PART reviews agreed to a greater extent than those not involved that difficulty obtaining timely data, difficulty identifying programmatic impacts, and difficulty resolving conflicting stakeholder interests hindered the collection and use of performance information, whereas there generally were no such differences in moderate and conservative agencies. Additionally, we find no statistically significant differences by agency ideology in how managers perceive impediments to performance management unless they report PART involvement. These results suggest that exposure to the PART reform itself, rather than inherent differences between agencies, triggers the differential effects of political ideology on performance information use.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we consider how political ideology might affect the implementation of administrative reforms, particularly performance management reforms. Second, we describe the politics and process of PART reviews in greater detail. Third, we discuss the data and empirical methods. Finally, we present and discuss the results and offer some concluding remarks regarding the implementation of reforms by partisan actors.

Political Ideology and Reform Implementation

A good deal of research states that the gap between the ideology (or policy preferences) of political executives and bureaucrats motivates political executives to devise ways to control and reshape government agencies (e.g., Arnold 1995; Gormley 1989; Moe 1993). Modern accounts often begin with President Nixon's "politicization" of federal agencies through appointments and his impoundment of agency budgets, or Reagan's imposition of various decision-making procedures intended to limit agencies' policymaking discretion and the promulgation of federal regulations altogether. Reagan's management policies[2] in particular became perceived as an attempt to undermine liberal programs (Durant 1987; Golden 2000; Tomkin 1998). But this is not merely a Republican phenomenon. Lewis (2008), for example, demonstrates that presidents of both parties use their appointment power most aggressively in ideologically divergent agencies.

This research emphasizes how ideological divergence between agencies and presidents has motivated presidential reform efforts. Does conflicting political ideology influence bureaucratic behavior, too? O' Leary (2006), for example, describes how bureaucrats may seek ways to avoid what they see as the most negative effects of such efforts. Overt resistance appears to be more frequent when a marked distance between the preferences of the political executive and the agency is accompanied with overt hostility and efforts to dismantle programs (e.g., Durant 1987; Golden 2000). Yet, even less overtly political reforms are susceptible to bureaucratic indifference or even hostility within agencies antagonistic to the president sponsoring them. An example is the negative reception for President Clinton's Reinventing Government reforms in the Department of Defense, which occurred partly because of distrust

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[2] In this context, we understand public management policies according to the definition presented by Barzelay (2001): government wide institutional rules and routines.

among members of this conservative department toward their liberal commander-in-chief (Durant 2008).

Some research cautions against overstating bureaucratic resistance to reform. Kelman (2005) suggests that in many instances bureaucrats are eager to support reforms that will make them more effective. Meier (2000) points to examples where reforms clearly ran against bureaucratic interests but were faithfully implemented nonetheless. Golden (2000) notes that bureaucrats are capable of tempering their own policy preferences in recognition of legitimate political authority. And Wood and Waterman (1994) find that bureaucrats are generally quite responsive to political principals.

Nevertheless, a standard claim in studies of successful organizational change is the need to build internal support and overcome bureaucratic resistance, often via processes promoting employee participation (Fernandez and Rainey 2006). Dramatic ideological differences between agency staff and political executives both encourage resistance and make it more difficult to find participatory processes to overcome this resistance. Additionally, employees need not engage in active resistance to undermine a reform's implementation. A passive response may be enough to doom a reform that depends upon bureaucratic cooperation. Bureaucrats may pursue only minimal pro-forma implementation in order to wait out the reform and the political leadership that sponsored it.

Political Ideology, Performance Management, and Performance Information Use

Political ideology in the United States is often defined on a one-dimensional scale ranging from liberal to moderate to conservative. These categories are typically thought to reflect individuals' political views about the proper role of government and the substance of public

policy. The liberal left generally is thought to prefer greater government involvement in societal affairs—for example, via public programs that regulate the marketplace, that redistribute societal resources, that promote social equality, and so on—than the conservative right. The conservative right also tends to be associated with policies thought to promote greater market freedom, smaller government, as well as greater national security. The notion of political ideology is an imperfectly defined construct, but it is a heuristic that citizens—including government employees—often use to make inferences about political actors and their actions. Because government agencies vary in terms of the political ideologies with which their employees, the programs they administer, and their stakeholders are associated, the notion of "agency ideology" is a potentially useful construct.

There are at least three potentially overlapping reasons why agency ideology might influence managers' willingness to implement the type of performance management reform we examine here. First, political ideology might reflect beliefs about appropriate management processes. For example, conservative actors may be more likely to agree that performance management tools are suitable for managing public programs (Stalebrink and Frisco 2011, 10). And liberal managers might feel that performance management tools are inherently ill-suited to the types of programs they oversee. Second, managers who share a political actor's ideology may simply be more trusting of and receptive to any initiative the political actor proposes. Without knowing too much about the initiative itself, they view the actor's support as a heuristic upon which they can judge its quality. Third, ideology roughly captures substantive policy preferences, and managers may view administrative reforms as an alternative means to alter substantive policy outcomes. Agency managers with relatively liberal policy preferences, or those who manage programs traditionally supported by liberal political constituencies, may resist

attempts by a conservative administration to alter programs in substantively significant ways. Career officials may worry that the reform is really intended to alter program goals, reduce a program's budget, or minimize agency discretion. Such resistance may increase if reforms are thought to conflict with the beliefs that employees have formed in relation to their jobs (for example, that their tasks have obvious value and that they need a measure of autonomy to succeed).

In addition to ideologically driven managerial resistance, ideologically driven behavior by the political actor initiating reforms may undermine implementation. In the case of performance management, ideologically conservative political principals may be more suspicious and critical of liberal programs, requiring better and more data to examine program performance. Thus, the demands of performance management may impose a relatively high administrative burden on agencies administering liberal programs and may, therefore, undermine some goals of the reform initiative.[3]

Existing empirical research does not provide a great deal of insight into these different dynamics in the case of performance management reforms. There is relatively little attention paid to the impact of conflict between presidents and agencies on the use of performance information in federal agencies. However, case studies point to the inherently political environment in which performance information use occurs (Radin 2006; Moynihan 2008), with actors in the policy process using performance data to represent competing values. There are some empirical findings linking political factors and information use. Research that examines the role of political executives usually focuses on the relationship between information use and executives' support

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[3] It also may be that programs with relatively liberal constituencies, such as those involving business regulation or the delivery of social services, may not lend themselves to performance management. For example, it may be that identifying programmatic impacts is simply more difficult for the types of programs administered by liberal agencies. We consider this possibility in the empirical analysis.

for, involvement in, or credible commitment to, performance management processes. A range of studies show that more support and commitment is associated with greater use (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Dull 2009; Melkers 2006; Moynihan and Ingraham, 2004). The power of political executives at the state level also has been associated with greater managerial use of performance data (Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008), and Yang and Pandey (2009) found that general political support for an organization is associated with greater implementation of managing-for-results practices.

Other research that has considered the role of the political environment on performance information use has shown that perceived public interest in accountability or performance data (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Moynihan and Ingraham 2004; Moynihan and Pandey 2010) and population heterogeneity (Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008) are associated with higher managerial use of performance information. Political competition between parties has been found to be positively associated with use in some instances (Askim Johnsen, and Christophersen 2008) but not in others (Moynihan and Ingraham 2004). Dull (2009) finds that political conflict between internal and external stakeholders is negatively associated with performance information use among federal managers in one time period, but not in others, while Hall and Jennings (2011) find that political conflict undercuts the use of evidence-based information across state governments. Finally, more liberal political settings have been associated with greater use of performance data (Askim, Johnsen, and Christophersen 2008; Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008; Moynihan and Ingraham 2004).

To date, there have been no studies that examine how ideological tensions—that is, differences in ideological leanings between political executives and agencies—affect

performance information use. The Bush administration's PART review process provides an unprecedented opportunity to study such dynamics.

The Politics of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

Efforts to make public management more goal- and results-oriented generally enjoy bipartisan support. GPRA, which was passed in 1993 and provides the point of origin for the modern era of federal performance management, is no exception. But by the time President George W. Bush arrived in office, GPRA was perceived as a helpful yet under-exploited tool for performance management (Dull 2006). The Bush White House criticized GPRA for failing to spur managers to use performance information, saying "After eight years of experience [since the passage of GPRA], progress toward the use of performance information for program management has been discouraging …Performance measures are insufficiently used to monitor and reward staff, or to hold program managers accountable" (US OMB 2001, 27). A central reason why the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) created PART was to remedy this problem.

The PART review process sought to systematically grade federal programs on an ineffective-to-effective scale according to four different criteria (program purpose and design, strategic planning, program management, and program results/accountability). Evaluating programs using the rating tool was a labor-intensive process conducted by OMB budget examiners in cooperation with agency managers. PART reviews were conducted in waves from 2003 through 2008 and included nearly all federal programs.

Some of the Bush administration's management practices were criticized as partisan and damaging to neutral competence (Pfiffner 2007), but much of the scholarship on PART instead

focused on more technical aspects of its design and implementation (see Joyce [2011] for an overview). The Bush administration took great care to establish PART's credibility (Dull 2006). The assessment tool was pilot-tested and revised based on extensive feedback from a wide range of experts and stakeholders. A special team within the OMB was created to make early versions of the tool more systematic. An outside advisory council of public management experts and a workshop from the National Academy of Public Administration were consulted. PART questions were dropped if they were perceived as lending themselves to an ideological interpretation. The OMB-trained budget examiners created a 92-page training manual and established a team to cross-check responses for consistency, all in the name of reducing subjectivity. Mitch Daniels, the OMB director who created the PART questionnaire, pushed staff to develop a non-partisan instrument (Moynihan 2008) and public presentations of the PART by OMB officials to stakeholders and agency personnel promoted it as a non-partisan tool. Once in operation, the OMB also made all of the detailed PART assessments public and available on the internet in order to check against examiner biases—a practice that also demonstrated the confidence that the OMB had in the tool and the judgments it elicited.

Whatever the intent of the Bush administration, many actors outside of the White House were skeptical or questioned the usefulness of PART reviews. Even though PART scores influenced executive branch budget formulation (Gilmour and Lewis 2006a, 2006b), the evidence suggests that they did not significantly influence congressional budgetary decisions (Heinrich 2011; Frisco and Stalebrink 2008). Few congressional staff used PART information (GAO 2008, 19) and congressional Democrats considered PART a partisan tool (although, in their analysis of legislative attitudes toward PART, Stalebrink and Frisco [2011] do not find that conservative members of Congress were more supportive of PART). Efforts to institutionalize

PART review via statute failed, reflecting partisan and institutional disagreement about its purpose and merit (Moynihan 2008). Indeed, in campaign documents the Obama team characterized PART as an ideological tool and the Obama administration ultimately decided against continuing its implementation.

The Perspective of Agency Managers

Agency managers had a number of reasons to view PART reviews as important and, therefore, to use them to manage programs with which they were involved. First, PART scores had an impact on OMB's budgetary decisions (Gilmour and Lewis 2006a; 2006b). Second, the review process itself involved significant commitments of time and effort on the part of both the OMB and agency managers and created a dialogue about the purpose, goals, and management of agency programs (Moynihan 2008). Such interactions encouraged greater awareness of performance management as a tool, as well as presidential commitment to it. Finally, the OMB implemented mechanisms so that PART reviews would inform program management. For example, each PART assessment generated a series of management recommendations and OMB officials could later assess how faithfully agency managers followed their guidance. The GAO concluded that "agencies have clear incentives to take the PART seriously" (GAO 2005b, 16).

When agency and OMB officials disagreed about PART evaluations, it might have been chalked up to professional or interpersonal, rather than political, disagreement (Moynihan 2008). But the role of the OMB was to represent the President, and some of the basic features of PART introduced politics into the process. For example, if agency managers disagreed with OMB assessments their only appeal option was to OMB political appointees. This mechanism could be assumed to provide greater comfort to managers in conservative agencies who might expect

more sympathetic treatment from such appointees. It also created a context where career budget examiners wishing to avoid seeing their decisions overturned had an incentive to internalize the preferences of their political superiors. The management recommendations made by the OMB via the PART review process also frequently had less to do with management and more to do with policy preferences. A GAO (2005a) study found that more than half of management recommendations centered on what were appropriate program goals and how they should be measured.

There were other reasons for agency officials to be wary of PART. Any government-wide reform will encounter claims that it lacks nuance and fails to appreciate the particular characteristics of a specific program (Radin 2006). PART, which was essentially a standardized questionnaire, was no exception, and liberal managers may have worried that the emphasis on measurement undermined their programs. Studies of particular PART assessments have shown that the process discounted values traditionally associated with more liberal programs, such as those related to equity (Radin 2006), citizenship rights (Wichowsky and Moynihan 2008), resource redistribution (Greitens and Joaquin 2010), and environmental protection (Thomas and Fumia 2011).

In a series of studies David E. Lewis and colleagues provide the most systematic empirical evidence that conservative and liberal programs were affected differently by the PART review process. Programs established under Democratic presidents received systematically lower PART scores than those created under Republican presidents, particularly in the area of strategic planning (Gilmour and Lewis 2006c). A later review using all PART evaluations and a different measure of political ideology confirmed this pattern. Programs in conservative agencies achieved

the highest PART scores, followed by programs in politically moderate agencies, and, finally, doing least well, programs in liberal agencies (Gallo and Lewis 2012).

Even if this pattern does not prove political bias, it does show that managers from liberal agencies engaged in the PART process experienced more stringent criticism of their strategic goals and received lower scores than managers in other agencies. Additionally, managers sensed this pattern, say Greitens and Joaquin (2010, 556), with the result that "many managers from programs whose missions were not aligned with the president's agenda often resisted performance assessment, while managers from favored agencies or programs whose missions were aligned with the president's agenda often used performance assessment to showcase the effectiveness of their programs."

Additionally, programs in traditionally Democratic agencies were the only ones whose PART scores correlated with OMB budgetary decisions, suggesting that programs more consistent with Republican ideology were insulated from PART scores during OMB's budget formulation process (Gilmour and Lewis 2006b). Thus, managers in conservative agencies had reason to believe that their funding would be stable regardless of PART scores, making it easier for them to embrace PART as a management tool. By contrast, managers in liberal agencies enjoyed no such comfort, making it more likely that they would view PART as a budgetary threat.

An initial analysis of GAO performance management surveys found that PART involvement had a weak relationship with the use of performance information to manage or solve problems (Moynihan and Lavertu 2012), but the study did not account for the ideological dynamics we describe here. What we know about the Bush administration's PART initiative suggests that political ideology may have attenuated the willingness and ability of agency

managers to implement the performance management practices PART evaluations sought to encourage. These possible mechanisms capture what we consider the "politics of PART." Thus, we offer the following hypothesis.

> *Hypothesis:* Managerial involvement in the PART review process was more likely to have promoted performance information use in agencies associated with relatively conservative programs or personnel.

Methodology

Determining the extent to which political ideology affected PART's impact on performance information use requires measures of information use, involvement with PART, and agency ideology. We employ data from a survey of agency managers to create measures of information use and exposure to PART. Specifically, to create these measures we use survey items that ask agency managers to identify levels of information use, hindrances to information use, and involvement with PART reviews. To approximate differences in policy preferences or ideology, we employ a measure that categorizes agencies according to their ideological proclivities—liberal, moderate, or conservative. Thus, the results we present below are from models that estimate the relationship between managers' reported involvement with PART reviews, the ideological tradition or orientation of the agency in which managers work, and managers' reported information use and perceptions regarding the impact of performance measurement problems on information use. Additionally, to test the robustness of our findings, we employ control variables based on a number of items that ask managers about other factors thought to influence information use.

Data

The bulk of the data come from a GAO survey of federal managers that inquires about the implementation of performance management reforms in federal agencies. The survey was administered to a random, nationwide sample of mid- and upper-level federal employees in the agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the vast majority of whom are career officials. The survey prompt tells respondents that the GAO is interested in studying performance information use, the impact of PART, and respondents' "experiences and perceptions with regard to performance management issues and related challenges." There is an oversampling of managers from certain agencies to facilitate comparisons across 29 different agencies. The response rate was 70% overall, ranging between 55% and 84% across agencies. While the GAO administered similar surveys in 1996, 2000, 2003 (e.g., see Dull 2009), the 2007 data are the only ones that include both agency identifiers (necessary to code agency ideology) and measures of PART involvement.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the variables we employ and provide descriptive statistics, so we do not describe most of them here. The survey asked managers about the extent to which they use performance data for a range of purposes. The variables we created based on these items are listed in Table 1. Aggregating all measures into a single index of use (as the GAO and Dull [2009] have done) is justified based on a strong value of Cronbach's alpha (0.95), and we use such an index in some preliminary statistical models. But to ensure that the findings do not rest solely upon the use of a highly aggregated measure, and to examine if the effects of political ideology vary depending on the type of information use, we estimate separate models for each type of information use.

[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here.]

The indicator *PART involvement* is based on an item inquiring about the extent to which respondents reported being "involved" in PART reviews, ranging from 0 ("to no extent") to 4 ("to a very great extent"). The variable reflects the process of implementing PART, which depended upon engaging specific groups of employees while having little effect on others. Agency employees responsible for performance measurement, planning and evaluation, and budgeting processes are likely to have been directly involved in negotiating with OMB officials over PART scores. Program managers and staff whose programs were evaluated also became involved in collecting agency information and responding to management recommendations offered through the PART review process. The survey data show that 31 percent of managers surveyed were involved with PART at least to some extent.

Indicator variables of agency ideology, *Liberal, Moderate,* and *Conservative*, are based on a study by Joshua Clinton and David Lewis (2008), who used expert surveys and measurement models to estimate agency ideology scores.[4] The survey item reads as follows:

> *Please see below a list of United States government agencies that were in existence between 1988–2005. I am interested to know which of these agencies have policy views due to law, practice, culture, or tradition that can be characterized as liberal or conservative. Please place a check mark (√) in one of the boxes next to each agency— ''slant Liberal, Neither Consistently, slant Conservative, Don't Know.''* (p5)

Table 3 lists the agencies included in this analysis and how they are categorized by ideology. While it would be ideal to also have individual- or program-level measures of political

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[4] Clinton and Lewis calculated these estimates using a multi-rater item response model. We coded agencies as moderate if the confidence interval of the estimate from Clinton and Lewis (2008, 17-19) intersects zero. We encourage readers to consult that article for an analysis of how their ideology estimates compare to other estimates of agency policy preferences.

ideology, the GAO did not collect this information. Research has shown the utility of the agency-level ideology scores that we use for understanding PART scores (Gallo and Lewis 2012), but not for understanding agency managers' responses to PART. The use of agency-level ideology scores also provides some reassurance that the central findings from this study are not the function of response bias or common-source methods bias.

[Insert Table 3 about here.]

Models and Results

First, we estimated separate statistical models for managers working in liberal, moderate, and conservative agencies so that differences in effects are easily discernible (e.g., see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Specifically, we estimated Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models when the dependent variable is the overall index of use and ordered probit models when the dependent variable is an individual measure of use. Second, we estimated ordered probit models in which the interaction between agency ideology and PART involvement is modeled explicitly. In reporting the results of models with interaction terms, we present a series of figures that plot the predicted probability of information use for different levels of PART involvement within liberal and non-liberal agencies. We do this to provide an intuitive sense for the magnitude of the impact on information use of agency ideology and PART involvement, as well as to address difficulties in the interpretation of interaction terms in models with limited dependent variables.

Additionally, we present the results of models estimated with and without statistical controls. The statistical controls (listed in Table 2) enable us to account for some of the differences across programs and agencies that might correspond to differences in ideology and the influence of PART involvement. Specifically, we include variables that account for manager

characteristics (membership to the Senior Executive Service and years spent as a supervisor) and include variables that capture factors thought to influence information use—measures of leadership commitment and decision-making authority, as well as measures of perceived oversight by political principals. Our use of statistical controls is meant primarily to test the robustness of the relationship between PART involvement, agency ideology, and performance information use.

Finally, it is important to note that the standard errors we report for all models are clustered by agency, so that the results are not driven by a few agencies.[5] We use these standard errors to identify significance levels for two-tailed tests (**$p<0.05$;*$p<0.10$), so that a single star indicates significance at the $p<0.05$ level for a one-tailed test. In other words, two stars indicates significance at the $p<0.05$ for a two-tailed test, and one star indicates significance at the $p<0.05$ for a one-tailed test. We use the one-tailed criterion for the purpose of testing our hypothesis.

The preliminary results presented in Table 4 are from OLS models that employ the index of overall information use. The results indicate that the correlation between managerial involvement with PART reviews and information use is positive and statistically significant in models limited to conservative agencies, but that the correlation is not consistently positive and never statistically significant in models limited to liberal agencies. These results obtain whether or not statistical controls are included. Additionally, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between PART involvement and information use in moderate agencies, but the coefficient reaches traditional levels of statistical significance only when statistical controls are excluded. Overall, these preliminary regressions suggest that the positive relationship between PART involvement and information use is contingent on agency ideology.

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[5] In addition, as a robustness check, we estimated models that exclude the Department of Defense, as this is a large and conservative agency that could be driving our results. Analogous results obtain in all models when this agency is omitted.

[Insert Table 4 about here.]

The regression results presented in Table 4 provide some additional insight worth considering. The coefficients for the constants in the first three regressions represent the mean levels of information use perceived by managers who report no involvement in the PART review process. The results indicate that managers in liberal agencies who were not involved with PART reviews reported using performance information to a greater extent than managers in conservative and moderate agencies (though the difference typically is not statistically significant across different types of information use). The results also indicate that this difference essentially disappears among those who report being involved in PART reviews. Crudely, one can see this by adding the *PART involvement* coefficient to the constant in order to calculate levels of information use among those minimally involved with PART reviews. Thus, it may be that, overall, the positive impact of PART involvement in moderate and conservative agencies simply brought up information use to levels reported by managers in liberal agencies (a possibility we explore in greater depth below).

The control variables are not the focus of our study, so we refrain from discussing their estimated coefficients here except to say that leadership commitment to information use, decision-making authority, and oversight by managers' supervisors are strongly linked to reported levels of performance information use. The findings regarding commitment and decision-making authority are consistent with previous studies (Dull 2009; Moynihan and Pandey 2010). Interestingly, we also find that for liberal and moderate agencies, managers who perceive that their department secretary pays attention to information use report lower levels of information use. There is no such relationship in conservative agencies. This might be further evidence of an ideological effect. That said, the interpretation of results from the models that

include controls should be tentative, as they capture interrelated factors. As we mention above, we estimate models with these controls mainly as a robustness check.[6]

Finally, it is worth noting that the R-squared statistics in the first three models indicate that PART involvement explains about three percent of the variance in information use in moderate and conservative agencies (and additional analyses reveal that it explains about one percent of the variance when control variables are included) whereas it does not explain any variance in information use in liberal agencies. These statistics and the other results in Table 4 give us some indication of the impact of PART involvement, but one needs to keep in mind that this is just a preliminary analysis of the data. The components of the index may vary in how they relate to PART involvement. Estimating separate models for each component enables us to more appropriately model these relationships and to characterize the substantive impact of PART involvement in a more intuitive way.

To gain a more nuanced understanding of how political ideology mediates the impact of PART involvement, we estimated ordered probit models to analyze components of the use index individually. Once again, we estimated the models with and without controls and present the results in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively.[7]

[Insert Table 5 and 6 about here.]

The results mirror the findings presented in Table 4 to a great extent. In the regressions without controls (Table 5), PART involvement has a statistically significant and positive effect in both moderate and conservative agencies for all of the 12 measures of performance information

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[6] Disentangling the complicated interrelationships involving our control variables is beyond the scope of this study. We focus on the relationship between PART involvement, agency ideology, and information use in part because the simplicity and robustness of this relationship lends us confidence that it is not a statistical artifact. That said, it would be beneficial if future research explored further how our primary predictor variables and control variables interrelate.

[7] Due to space constraints, cut scores and the coefficients for control variables are not presented, and the results for 12 of 13 measures of information use are presented. We do not present the results of models that employ *Sharing* as the dependent variable, as they are similar to those of models employing *Coordination*.

use. But in 8 of the 12 estimates for liberal agencies, PART involvement has no statistically significant effect. If we include organizational controls, the size and significance of the estimated coefficients for *PART involvement* generally decline, but they remain uniformly positive for moderate and conservative agencies and attain traditional levels of statistical significance in 5 of 12 models for moderate agencies and in 9 of 12 models for conservative agencies. Finally, with the inclusion of controls, PART involvement has a positive and statistically significant effect on information use in liberal agencies in only one instance (to develop and manage contracts) and a negative and statistically significant effect in three models.

The results in Tables 4-6 indicate that the relationship between PART involvement and performance information use varies in terms of magnitude and statistical significance across agencies associated with different ideologies. In general, the impact of PART involvement in liberal agencies differs from its impact in non-liberal agencies. Tables 7 and 8 present figures that illustrate the substantive significance of these differences. The figures are based on estimates from ordered probit models that explicitly interact agency ideology (liberal or not) with our measure of PART involvement. (The full results from these models are presented in the appendix.) Specifically, Tables 7 and 8 present figures that plot the predicted probability that respondents agreed "to a very great extent" that they use performance information for each listed purpose. These probabilities are illustrated for respondents in liberal (black diamonds) and non-liberal (empty circles) agencies. The level of PART involvement is demarcated along the x-axis and the predicted probability of use is demarcated on the y axis. Finally, the differences in probability between the lowest and highest levels of PART involvement are specified at the bottom of each figure.

[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here.]

In some figures, the differences in slopes are minimal. For example, in terms of using performance information for developing program strategy, the probability that respondents report using information "to a very great extent" increases by 0.1 in liberal agencies, and by 0.15 in moderate and conservative agencies, as PART involvement increases from the lowest to highest level. While the impact of PART involvement in this case is substantively significant (e.g., the probability of such agreement doubles in moderate and conservative agencies, from 0.16 to 0.32), the marginal impact is not terribly different between liberal and non-liberal agencies. On the other hand, when it comes to identifying problems, the differences between liberal and non-liberal agencies are substantively significant. The probability that respondents in liberal agencies agree "to a very great extent" that they use information in "identifying program problems to be addressed" goes from 0.27 down to 0.26 when moving from low to high levels of PART involvement. In moderate and conservative agencies, however, the probability of such agreement goes from 0.21 to 0.37. The differences in the impact of PART involvement between liberal and non-liberal agencies seems most pronounced when it comes to setting program priorities, allocating resources, identifying problems and taking action to address those problems, setting performance goals, and managing employees (in terms of setting expectations and offering rewards). Indeed, PART involvement seems to have had a negative impact on the use of information for employee management in liberal agencies, whereas it seems to have had a positive impact in moderate and conservative agencies.

Discussion: Explaining the Effects of Political Ideology on Performance Management

The results provide evidence that the effects of PART in liberal agencies differed from those in moderate, and especially, conservative agencies. The overall positive impact of

managers' involvement with PART reviews on information use appears to be largely contingent on an agency being associated with a moderate or conservative ideology. This section further examines what it is about the PART review process that might have led to these differences. In particular, we examine whether features of traditionally liberal programs, which are more likely to involve business regulation and the provision of social services, account for the ideological effect we find, or whether the PART review process in fact affected liberal and non-liberal agencies differently.

For example, identifying programmatic goals and measuring outcomes may be more difficult for programs associated with political conflict. Indeed, Greitens and Joaquin (2010) find that more redistributive programs, which are likely to be associated with liberal agencies, scored less well under PART than other agencies. More broadly, scholars have argued that the impacts of some programs are simply more difficult to measure, something the one-size-fits-all nature of performance requirements fails to appreciate (Wilson 1989; Radin 2006). While there have not been studies that directly relate Wilson's typology of program types to PART, studies have shown that goal ambiguity is associated with lower PART scores (Rainey and Jung 2010; Thomas and Fumia 2011). Finally, in examining PART's program typology, one might expect the outcomes to be more difficult to measure for some program types. For example, the design of block grants, which entails significant policy and administrative discretion, seems at odds with PART's requirement that a single set of performance measures be used (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). Indeed, evidence shows that block grants received lower PART scores than other program types (Gallo and Lewis 2012).[8]

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[8] Surprisingly, perhaps, research and development programs scored significantly higher than other program types (Gallo and Lewis 2012), perhaps because the scientific community succeeded in persuading the OMB to show greater flexibility because of the inherent difficulties in measuring outcomes (Gilmour 2006, 12).

Even with the inclusion of statistical controls to account for program types, Gallo and Lewis (2012) find that agency ideology significantly predicts PART scores. In this study we find that ideology mediates the impact of PART on managerial performance information use and, in this supplementary analysis, we investigate whether this finding is attributable to differences between liberal and non-liberal programs in terms of measurement difficulties and the political conflict that could exacerbate these difficulties. In the same 2007 survey we used for the analysis above, the GAO asked managers to identify what factors hindered the collection and use of performance information. Table 9 focuses on three perceived program-level hindrances that we found to be related to PART involvement even when controlling for all of the variables included in Table 6. Once again, the results are from ordered probit models, cut scores and control coefficients are suppressed, and standard errors were clustered by agency.

[Insert Table 9 about here.]

The results in Table 9 reveal that managers in liberal agencies involved with PART reviews agreed to a significantly greater extent than those not involved with PART reviews that performance measurement problems hindered their collection and use of performance information. It appears that "difficulty obtaining data in time to be useful," "difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the program and results caused by other factors," and "difficulty resolving conflicting interests of stakeholders, either internal or external," were perceived as greater impediments to performance management in liberal agencies if managers reported involvement with PART reviews. However, such effects were statistically insignificant in moderate and conservative agencies. Moreover, we estimated models that explicitly model the interaction between PART involvement and whether or not a respondent worked in a liberal

agency. (The full results are presented in Table A2 in the appendix). These models reveal that

PART involvement's impact is statistically different in liberal and non-liberal agencies.[9]

Table 10 plots the predicted probabilities that respondents agreed "to a very great extent"

that a factor was an impediment to information collection and use. The graphs reveal a number

of interesting findings. First, it is important to note that *those not involved with PART reviews*

perceived hindrances similarly whether they were in liberal, moderate, or conservative agencies.

If anything, among managers not involved in PART reviews, those in liberal agencies agreed to a

lesser extent that the above difficulties were hindrances to collection and use. In other words,

there does not seem to be inherent differences between liberal and non-liberal agencies in terms

of how difficult managers believe it is to collect and use performance information.

Second, the results indicate that it is only in liberal agencies that PART involvement is

positively related to perceived impediments to performance information collection and use. In

particular, while managers in moderate and conservative agencies were just as likely to agree "to

a very great extent" that measuring program performance was a challenge if they were or were

not involved with PART reviews, PART involvement is associated with a threefold increase in

agreement in liberal agencies (from a 0.07 probability of agreement to a probability of 0.23).

These findings provide support for the notion that the impact of ideology on information use

occurred through the PART mechanism—that it is not attributable to inherent differences in

liberal agencies' general attitude toward performance information use or their ability to use

performance management practices. This supplementary analysis is not central to our study but it

is highly insightful. As noted above, prior work has rightly cautioned that the type of program a

manager oversees may make it more or less difficult to employ performance management

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[9] The coefficients and statistical significance of these coefficients for the interaction terms indicated in the output cannot be trusted, as we are dealing with an ordered probit model. However, additional tests revealed that these differences reach traditional levels of statistical significance.

practices. Our results suggest that agency ideology and the specific performance management

tool employed also may affect how managers perceive performance measurement difficulties.

Specifically, whether a manager perceived political conflict and difficulty in measuring

outcomes appears to be partly attributable to the politics of the PART review process.

The simplest explanation for these findings is that engaging in the PART review process

itself affected how managers in liberal agencies perceived the costs and benefits of adopting

performance management practices.[10] Indeed, supplementary analyses reveal that including these

"hindrance" variables as controls in the general OLS regressions (those reported in Table 4)

attenuates to a significant extent differences in liberal and non-liberal agencies in terms of the

impact of PART involvement on information use. For example, the coefficient for *PART*

involvement becomes positive (0.06) and statistically significant if one controls for hindrances in

the first parsimonious model reported in Table 4. Previously we suggested that one reason why

managers in liberal agencies might resist performance management reforms is simple antipathy

towards performance management in general—in other words, that political ideology represents

attitudes towards the reform itself. This is a plausible claim but we find no empirical support for

it. Indeed, although the results typically are not statistically significant, among managers not

involved with PART reviews, those in liberal agencies often agreed to a lesser extent than those

in conservative agencies that performance measurement difficulties were hindrances to

performance measurement and agreed to a greater extent than those in conservative agencies that

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[10] One potential competing interpretation is that managers involved with PART reviews were simply more
knowledgeable about the performance management limitations their agencies faced. But it is not clear why such an
effect would be limited only to managers in liberal agencies, and the selection effect is perhaps more plausible in the
other direction: managers who spend their careers creating performance measures are more likely to reject the claim
that it is hard to measure program performance.

they use performance information in decision-making. Instead, the effect of political ideology on performance information use seems limited to those who engaged in the PART process.

If one accepts that managers may distrust political executives of a different political ideology and (perhaps passively) resist their reforms, then one might expect such distrust during the Bush administration, given the perception that the White House was aggressively expanding its authority (Pfiffner 2007; Stalebrink and Frisco 2011) and the marked partisanship of the period (Hetherington 2009). Moreover, PART is an example of a reform that clearly posed risks to liberal programs. There is empirical evidence that PART reviews were more critical of strategic goals in liberal agencies and that lower PART scores influenced OMB's budget recommendations only in the case of liberal programs and agencies (Gallo and Lewis 2012; Gilmour and Lewis 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). It also may be that the manner in which the OMB under Bush administered PART reviews imposed a greater administrative burden on liberal agencies.

The results in Table 9 and Table 10 indicate that managers in liberal agencies who were engaged in PART reviews perceived greater difficulties in adopting performance management practices. This may have been because their experiences led them to believe that the OMB was unwilling to accept the data they collected, the causal claims they offered, and the goals they pursued. Or perhaps it was because PART reviews imposed a greater administrative burden on liberal agencies. Whether liberal agency managers' reported difficulties were real or simply perceived, the results of this study suggest that they are attributable to the politics of PART and that these politics inhibited PART's promotion of performance information use in liberal agencies. One might be cautious in accepting this deduction, perhaps fearing that comparing those who were and were not involved with PART reviews is inappropriate. For example,

perhaps liberal managers did not truly understand the challenges of performance management for their particular programs (e.g., those involving social services and business regulation) unless they were involved in the PART review process. Even if one is cautious about accepting our explanation, however, the results of this study provide compelling evidence that the divergence in the ideology of the president and agencies captures important dynamics in the politics of the implementation of performance management in federal agencies.

Conclusion

This study deals with a fundamental issue: how politics interacts with administrative reform. The claim that politics affects administration in innumerable ways is uncontroversial, and scholars have expended significant effort to understand better how political principals attempt to influence administrative behavior. Our study enhances our understanding of how employee responses to administrative reforms relate to agency ideology and, in doing so, contributes in important ways to answering a number of research questions. First, we contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of performance information use (e.g. Dull 2009; Moynihan and Pandey 2010) by examining the role of political ideology and how its impact might vary across different types of performance information use. Our use of agency ideological scores creates a relatively aggregated measure of ideology. Future research could better refine our approach by also incorporating individual- and program-level measures of ideology. However, to the extent that ideological variation exists within agencies, our finding on the impact of agency ideology likely occurs despite, not because of, such variation.

A second contribution deals with explaining the role of ideology in executive-branch policy implementation more generally. There is a growing literature that focuses on how political executives, particularly presidents, attempt to control executive-branch policy decisions using

various mechanisms (e.g., Lewis 2008) and the impact of their attempts on the behavior of agency personnel (e.g., Golden 2000). Understanding how the ideological gap between political executives and managers matters is important. Performance reforms are generally promoted by partisan political executives who strive to present them as nonpartisan changes (Dull 2006). The results of this study lead us to question whether any administrative reform that is identified with a political actor will be perceived as truly neutral. We offer systematic government-wide evidence that ideological factors may have influenced the Bush administration's success in promoting performance information use via the PART process. Thus, when it comes to reforms that depend upon bureaucratic cooperation, political executives may struggle to influence public employees who administer programs tied to competing ideological camps.

Table 1. Measures of Performance Information Use			
Variable	**Activity Description**	**N**	**Mean (S.D.)**
ORDINAL MEASURES			
Strategy	Developing program strategy	2,572	2.54 (1.07)
Priorities	Setting program priorities	2,591	2.66 (1.05)
Resources	Allocating resources	2,543	2.62 (10.6)
Problems	Identifying program problems to be addressed	2,627	2.71 (1.04)
Correction	Taking corrective action to solve program problems	2,631	2.70 (1.06)
Processes	Adopting new program approaches or changing work processes	2,625	2.58 (1.06)
Coordination	Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations	2,579	2.46 (1.10)
Sharing	Identifying and sharing effective program approaches with others	2,537	2.31 (1.09)
Contracts	Developing and managing contracts	1,868	2.17 (1.23)
Measures	Refining program performance measures	2,519	2.46 (1.11)
Goals	Setting new or revising existing performance goals	2,534	2.59 (1.10)
Expectations	Setting individual job expectations for the government employees the respondent manages or supervises	2,568	2.70 (1.03)
Rewards	Rewarding government employees that the respondent manages or supervises	2,556	2.66 (1.06)
INDEX			
Overall	Average response to all activities above	1,668	2.58 (0.87)
Note: Variables capture the extent to which respondents report using performance information for a particular set of activities. Responses range from "to no extent" (0) to "to a very great extent" (4).			

Table 2. Covariates			
Variable	**Description**	**N [range]**	**Mean (S.D.)**
IMPLEMENTATION			
PART Involvement	Based on answer to the following question: "To what extent, if at all, have you been involved in any PART-related activities? *(This includes any involvement in preparing for, participating in, or responding to the results of any PART assessment.)*" Responses are "to no extent" (0), "to a small extent" (1), "to a moderate extent" (2), "to a great extent" (3), and "to a very great extent" (4). Missing values and "no basis to judge" are coded as 0. Sixty-nine percent of respondents are coded with zero.	2,937 [0,4]	0.63 (1.11)
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS			
SES	Whether (1) or not (0) respondent is a member of the Senior Executive Service "or equivalent"	2,937 [0,1]	0.20 (0.40)
Supervisor Yrs	# of years (from 4 ranges) respondent reports serving as a supervisor	2,891 [1-4]	2.49 (1.13)
ORGANIZATIONAL/ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS			
Use Commitment	Extent to which respondents agree that their "agency's top leadership demonstrates a strong commitment to using performance information to guide decision making."(10H)	2,711 [1-5]	3.54 (1.09)
Authority	Extent to which respondents agree with this statement: "Agency managers/supervisors at my level have the decision making authority they need to help the agency accomplish its strategic goals." (10A)	2,886 [1-5]	3.20 (1.09)
Secretary	Extent to which respondents believe that the department secretary, the individual they report to, the Office of Management and Budget, congressional committees, or the audit community (e.g., GAO, Inspectors General) "pay attention to their agency's use of performance information in management decision making" (12A,12C,12F,12G,12H) [Ordinal range of each variable is from 0 to 5, as "not applicable" and "don't know" were coded 0]	2,823	1.83(1.83)
Supervisor		2,904	3.57(1.21)
OMB		2,913	2.16(1.92)
Congress		2,907	1.80(1.73)
Audit		2,914	2.21(1.87)

Table 3. Agencies Categorized by Perceived Ideology		
Liberal	**Moderate**	**Conservative**
AID	Forest Service	Commerce
Labor	Agriculture (Not Forest Service)	Defense
Education	General Services Administration	Justice
EPA	FEMA	Energy
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services	NASA	Homeland Security (Not FEMA)
HHS (Not CMS)	Office of Personnel Management	Interior
HUD	State	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSF	FAA	Small Business Administration
Social Security Administration	Transportation (Not FAA)	IRS
	Veterans Affairs	Treasury (Not IRS)

Note: The categorizations are from Clinton and Lewis (2008). Some agencies within departments (specifically, CMS, FAA, IRS, and Forest Service) are coded in the same way as the departments in which they are housed.

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
Table 4. Overview of Ideology and Information Use with a "Descriptive" Regression						
PART Involvement	0.04 (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.13** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)
SES				0.03 (0.09)	0.16* (0.08)	0.03 (0.05)
supervisor yrs				-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
use commitment				0.26** (0.06)	0.29** (0.07)	0.23** (0.04)
authority				0.07* (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08** (0.02)
secretary				-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
supervisor				0.18** (0.06)	0.22** (0.03)	0.18** (0.02)
OMB				-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Congress				0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
audit				0.08* (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Constant	2.57	2.49	2.48	0.74	0.71	0.67
N	455	607	606	406	548	558
# agency clusters	9	10	10	9	10	10
F statistics	1.34	15.34**	16.95**	N/A	N/A	N/A
R2	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.37	0.36	0.30

Note: The above results are from Ordinary Least Squares regression models estimating the extent of information use based on a summative index of individual measures of use. (See bottom of Table 1.) Standard errors are clustered by agency and appear in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests (**$p<0.05$;*$p<0.10$), so that a single star indicates significance at the $p<0.05$ level for a one-tailed test.

Table 5. Impact of PART Involvement on Information Use for Various Management Activities

	"Developing program strategy"			"Setting program priorities"			"Allocating resources"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.08* (0.05)	0.13** (0.03)	0.12** (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	0.12** (0.03)	0.13** (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)	0.10** (0.03)	0.12** (0.02)
N	737	893	942	737	902	952	723	881	939
Wald Chi2	3.04*	17.55**	15.97**	0.29	15.90**	24.07**	0.08	10.95**	28.31**
	"Identifying program problems to be addressed"			"Taking corrective action to solve program problems"			"Adopting new program approaches or changing work processes"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	-0.01 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.13** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.11** (0.03)
N	751	907	969	754	909	968	751	911	963
Wald Chi2	0.05	8.57**	13.96**	0.03	3.77*	7.58**	1.91	5.60*	13.55**
	"Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations"			"Refining program performance measures"			"Setting new or revising existing performance goals"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.06 (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.13** (0.05)	0.20** (0.04)	0.23** (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)	0.19** (0.04)	0.22** (0.03)
N	736	891	952	719	878	922	717	885	932
Wald Chi2	1.75	5.59**	6.17**	8.39**	28.71**	54.73**	7.93**	22.42**	43.48**
	"Setting individual job expectations for the… employees I manage or supervise"			"Rewarding government employees I manage or supervise"			"Developing and managing contracts"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	-0.03 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.12** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.13** (0.03)	0.12** (0.04)
N	731	893	944	730	889	937	515	679	674
Wald Chi2	0.67	2.87	17.38**	1.33	3.00*	8.17**	9.21**	16.60**	9.50**

Note: The above results are from ordered probit models estimating a 5-category measure of information use. The dependent variable is based on an item that reads "For those program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) that you are involved with, to what extent, if at all, do you use the information obtained from performance measurement when participating in the following activities?" Responses are coded as follows: "to no extent" (0), "to a small extent" (1), "to a moderate extent" (2), "to a great extent," (3), and "to a very great extent" (4). Cut scores are not reported. Standard errors are clustered by agency and appear in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests (**$p<0.05$;*$p<0.10$), so that a single star indicates significance at the $p<0.05$ level for a one-tailed test.

Table 6. Impact of PART Involvement on Information Use, Controlling for Respondent and Organizational Characteristics

	"Developing program strategy"			"Setting program priorities"			"Allocating resources"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.03 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.06* (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	0.10** (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.08** (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)
N	634	795	851	634	802	855	621	783	848
	"Identifying program problems to be addressed"			"Taking corrective action to solve program problems"			"Adopting new program approaches or changing work processes"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	-0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07** (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06** (0.02)
N	640	804	868	645	807	866	643	808	867
	"Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations"			"Refining program performance measures"			"Setting new or revising existing performance goals"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	0.15** (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	0.11** (0.03)
N	631	793	859	620	782	837	618	789	841
	"Setting individual job expectations for the… employees I manage or supervise"			"Rewarding government employees I manage or supervise"			"Developing and managing contracts"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	-0.08** (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)	0.08* (0.05)	0.08** (0.04)
N	631	795	850	630	792	843	454	603	618

Note: The above results are from ordered probit models estimating a 5-category measure of information use. The dependent variable is based on an item that reads "For those program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) that you are involved with, to what extent, if at all, do you use the information obtained from performance measurement when participating in the following activities?" Responses are coded as follows: "to no extent" (0), "to a small extent" (1), "to a moderate extent" (2), "to a great extent," (3), and "to a very great extent" (4). Cut scores and coefficients of control variables are not reported. Regressions include controls for respondent characteristics (*SES* and *supervisor yrs*) and organizational/environmental characteristics (*use commitment, authority, secretary, supervisor, OMB, Congress,* and *audit*). Wald statistics are not reported because STATA could not compute them reliably. Standard errors are clustered by agency and appear in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests (**p<0.05;*p<0.10), so that a single star indicates significance at the p<0.05 level for a one-tailed test.

Table 7. The probability that respondents agree "to a very great extent" that they use performance information

| Key: | black diamond = estimate for liberal agencies | x-axis = level of PART involvement |
| | empty circle = estimate for non-liberal agencies | y-axis = predicted probability of use "to a very great extent" |

i."Developing program strategy"	ii."Setting program priorities"	iii."Allocating resources"
<<Tab_7_Fig_i>>	<<Tab_7_Fig_ii>>	<<Tab_7_Fig_iii>>
Change: Liberal +0.10; Non-Liberal +0.15	Change: Liberal +0.04; Non-Liberal +0.16	Change: Liberal +0.02; Non-Liberal +0.14
iv."Identifying program problems to be addressed"	v."Taking corrective action to solve program problems"	vi."Adopting new program approaches or changing work processes"
<<Tab_7_Fig_iv>>	<<Tab_7_Fig_v>>	<<Tab_7_Fig_vi>>
Change: Liberal -0.01; Non-Liberal +0.16	Change: Liberal +0.01; Non-Liberal +0.13	Change: Liberal +0.07; Non-Liberal +0.12

Note: The figures present the predicted probability that respondents indicate using performance information "to a very great extent." The estimates are from ordered probit models estimating the interaction between PART involvement and whether or not an agency is associated with a liberal ideology. The full set of results from these models is reported in Table A1.

Table 8. The probability that respondents agree "to a very great extent" that they use performance information		
Key: black diamond = estimate for liberal agencies x-axis = level of PART involvement empty circle = estimate for non-liberal agencies y-axis = predicted probability of use "to a very great extent"		
vii."Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations" <<Tab_8_Fig_vii>> Change: Liberal +0.06; Non-Liberal +0.11	viii."Refining program performance measures" <<Tab_8_Fig_viii>> Change: Liberal +0.17; Non-Liberal +0.27	ix."Setting new or revising existing performance goals" <<Tab_8_Fig_ix>> Change: Liberal +0.13; Non-Liberal +0.27
x."Setting individual job expectations for the… employees I manage or supervise" <<Tab_8_Fig_x>> Change: Liberal -0.04; Non-Liberal +0.13	xi."Rewarding government employees I manage or supervise" <<Tab_8_Fig_xi>> Change: Liberal -0.04; Non-Liberal +0.10	xii."Developing and managing contracts" <<Tab_8_Fig_xii>> Change: Liberal +0.11; Non-Liberal +0.13
Note: The figures present the predicted probability that respondents indicate using performance information "to a very great extent." The estimates are from ordered probit models estimating the interaction between PART involvement and whether or not an agency is associated with a liberal ideology. The full set of results from these models is reported in Table A1.		

Table 9. PART Involvement and the Perception of Hindrances, Controlling for Respondent & Organizational Characteristics

	"Difficulty obtaining data in time to be useful"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.11* (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
N	674	836	907
	"Difficulty resolving conflicting interests of stakeholders, either internal or external"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.09** (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
N	651	820	891
	"Difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the program and results caused by other factors"		
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
PART Involvement	0.18** (0.06)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
N	670	827	893

Note: The above results are from ordered probit models estimating a 5-category measure of impediments to information collection and use. The dependent variable is based on an item that reads "Based on your experience with the program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) that you are involved with, to what extent, if at all, have the following factors hindered measuring performance or using the performance information?" Responses are coded as follows: "to no extent" (0), "to a small extent" (1), "to a moderate extent" (2), "to a great extent," (3), and "to a very great extent" (4). Cut scores and coefficients of control variables are not reported. Regressions include controls for respondent characteristics (*SES* and *supervisor yrs*) and organizational/environmental characteristics (*use commitment, authority, secretary, supervisor, OMB, Congress,* and *audit*). Wald statistics are not reported because STATA could not compute them reliably. Standard errors are clustered by agency and appear in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests (**$p<0.05$;*$p<0.10$), so that a single star indicates significance at the $p<0.05$ level for a one-tailed test.

Table 10. The probability that respondents agree "to a very great extent" that a factor hindered information collection and use.

Key:	black diamond= estimate for liberal agencies	x-axis = level of PART involvement
	empty circle = estimate for non-liberal agencies	y-axis = predicted probability hindered "to a very great extent"

i."Difficulty obtaining data in time to be useful"	ii."Difficulty resolving conflicting interests of stakeholders, either internal or external"
<<Tab_10_Fig_i>>	<<Tab_10_Fig_ii>>
Change: Liberal +0.09; Non-Liberal +0.00	Change: Liberal +0.07; Non-Liberal -0.01

iii."Difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the program and results caused by other factors"	
<<Tab_10_Fig_iii>>	
Change: Liberal +0.16; Non-Liberal +0.00	

Note: The figures present the predicted probability that respondents agree "to a very great extent" that a factor is an impediment to information collection and use. Control variables are included. The estimates are from ordered probit models estimating the interaction between PART involvement and whether or not an agency is associated with a liberal ideology. The full set of results from these models is reported in Table A1.

Appendix

Table A1. The Interactive Effect of Liberal Ideology and PART Involvement on Performance Information Use												
	Strategy	**Priorities**	**Resources**	**Problems**	**Action**	**Processes**	**Coordinating**	**Measures**	**Goals**	**Expectations**	**Rewards**	**Contracts**
PART*Liberal	-0.04	-0.09	-0.09*	-0.13**	-0.09**	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.10**	-0.13**	-0.11**	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
PART	0.12**	0.13**	0.11**	0.12**	0.09**	0.10**	0.09**	0.21**	0.20**	0.10**	0.08**	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Liberal	0.11	0.16	0.08	0.19**	0.17**	0.15	0.03	0.07	0.13*	0.10	0.07	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.12)
/cut 1	-1.59	-1.67	-1.69	-1.72	-1.72	-1.66	-1.58	-1.47	-1.49	-1.72	-1.69	-1.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
/cut 2	-0.88	-0.98	-0.98	-1.04	-1.02	-0.91	-0.81	-0.75	-0.83	-1.10	-1.04	-0.45
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
/cut 3	-0.03	-0.20	-0.17	-0.22	-0.21	-0.08	0.01	0.07	-0.10	-0.28	-0.23	0.26
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
/cut 4	0.98	0.89	0.88	0.81	0.76	0.94	0.98	1.08	0.97	0.80	0.80	1.21
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N	2,572	2,591	2,543	2,627	2,631	2,625	2,579	2,519	2,534	2,568	2,556	1,868
Wald Chi2	42.70**	44.70**	33.74**	28.46**	18.43**	30.48**	15.02**	99.06**	87.38**	17.08**	12.48**	37.88**
Pseudo R2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01

Note: The results are from ordered probit models estimating the types of information use examined in Table 5. This time, however, the focus is on the interaction between PART involvement and a variable indicating whether or not an agency is associated with a liberal ideology. Standard errors are clustered by agency and appear in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels for variable coefficients are based on two-tailed tests (**p<0.05;*p<0.10), so that a single star indicates significance at the p<0.05 level for a one-tailed test.

Table A2. Reported Hindrances to Performance Measurement and Information Use			
	"Difficulty obtaining data in time to be useful"	"Difficulty resolving conflicting interests of stakeholders, either internal or external"	"Difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the program and results caused by other factors"
PART*Liberal	0.12* (0.07)	0.11** (0.05)	0.17** (0.07)
PART	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02	0.08 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.19* (0.10)	-0.08 (0.11)
	(Coefficients for control variables omitted in the interest of space.)		
/cut 1	-1.88 (0.14)	-2.05 (0.14)	-2.07 (0.10)
/cut 2	-0.98 (0.13)	-1.18 (0.13)	-1.22 (0.08)
/cut 3	-0.26 (0.13)	-0.45 (0.13)	-0.45 (0.07)
/cut 4	0.49 (0.13)	0.29 (0.13)	0.36 (0.08)
N	2,417	2,362	2,390
Wald Chi2	200.43**	233.63**	221.35**
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.03	0.03

Note: The results are from ordered probit models estimating the hindrances to performance measurement and information use examined in Table 7. This time, however, the focus is on the interaction between PART involvement and a variable indicating whether or not an agency is associated with a liberal ideology. Standard errors are clustered by agency and appear in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels for variable coefficients are based on two-tailed tests (**p<0.05;*p<0.10), so that a single star indicates significance at the p<0.05 level for a one-tailed test.

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